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Abstract
This paper examines the revenue model selection of
app developers in a duopoly setting. Two developers
offering vertically-differentiated apps can adopt either
a pay-per-download or a freemium strategy. Under the
pay-per-download strategy, consumers pay a fee to
acquire the app. Under the freemium strategy,
consumers are offered with a free basic version and
can choose to pay an additional fee for the full version.
A game theoretical model is used to analyze the
competition in the presence of network effect and
learning effect. We find that when the quality difference
is moderate, the pay-per-download strategy is optimal
for the high-quality app if the quality of basic version
is low, otherwise freemium strategy is optimal.
Responding to the pay-per-download strategy of the
high-quality app, adopting the pay-per-download
strategy is optimal for the low-quality app if quality of
basic version is high, otherwise freemium strategy is
adopted.

1. Introduction
The comScore mobile report revealed that the
number of mobile users surpassed desktop users in
2014. Gartner also predicted that over 268 billion
smartphone application (“app”) downloads would
generate an income of $77 billion in 2017. The rising
app downloads promise great potential for revenues.
However the app market is extremely competitive and
saturated. As of March 2017, there were 2.8 million
available apps at Google Play Store and 2.2 billion
apps available in the Apple’s App Store, the two
leading app stores in the world. This number is
expected to increase in the future. Thus the market
calls for careful and thorough analyses of the app
developers’ revenue models, especially in a
competitive market.
According to software analyst firm VisionMobile,
commonly app revenue models include freemium,
in-app-purchase, pay-per-download, subscription and
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advertising.
Among
them,
freemium
and
pay-per-download are among the top in terms of
revenue generation for the developers. Under
Pay-per-download, users pay a fee to acquire the apps,
while under the freemium model, users are offered
with a free trial version of apps before deciding
whether to purchase the full version. Table 1 and Table
2 present a few examples of apps using the
pay-per-download strategy and freemium strategy.
Table 1. Examples of Pay-per-download Apps
App
Monument Valley 2
Enlight
HotSchedules
Toca Hair Salon
Dark Sky Weather

Price
4.99
3.99
2.99
2.99
3.99

Category
Games
Photo & Video
Business
Education
Weather

Table 2. Examples of Freemium Apps
App
Geometry Dash Lite
Geometry Dash
Speak & Translate – Voice and
Text Translator
Speak & Translate – Live Voice
and Text Translator
Live Wallpapers for Me – Free
Moving Backgrounds
Live Wallpapers for Me –
Animated HD Backgrounds
Planes Live Free – Flight Status
Tracker & Radar
Planes Live – Flight Status
Tracker & Radar
Scanner for Me – Free PDF
Scanner & Printer App
Scanner for Me –PDF Scan with
OCR for Documents

Price
Free
1.99

Category
Games

Free
Reference
19.99
Free
1.99

Entertainm
ent

Free
Travel
6.99
Free
Business
4.99

Compared with the pay-per-download strategy, free
trial under the freemium strategy affects app sales in
several ways. First, offering two versions capture the
network effect from both trial users and buyers. Due to
a larger network, consumers have higher utilities,
which may further increase consumer demand for the
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paid version and bring more profit to the app developer.
Second, the demand for the paid version can be
cannibalized by that for the free version because some
consumers may find it sufficient to use the free version
only and choose not to buy the full version. Third, after
trying the basic version, consumers revise their beliefs
about the full version. If the quality of the basic version
is much higher than consumers’ expectation,
consumers raise their beliefs regarding the quality of
the full version. For example, many game apps offer
two versions to consumers, where the basic version
provides some game stages for a free trial and the full
version requires the users to pay to unlock the
additional game stages. After trying the basic version, a
user can tell whether she likes this kind of game or not.
Due to the consistency in game design between the
trial and full versions, the users can update the beliefs
about the quality of the full version based on the
experience of using the trials.
Considering network effect and experience-based
learning effect, we study the competition between two
app developers who offer vertically-differentiated apps.
Specifically, we examine how consumers’ expected
quality and true quality of the two versions impact the
developers’
strategy
choices
between
pay-per-download strategy and freemium strategy in
equilibrium. This paper takes the initiative to
analytically model and compare the most common
revenue models for app developers, aiming to examine
the equilibrium of how mobile developers choose
revenue models in reaction to users’ responses and
competitors’ strategies.
Our paper is related to the literature regarding free
trial strategy of information products. The effect of free
trial strategy was examined in empirical studies ([1],
[8], [9]). Considering network effect, cannibalization
effect and learning effect, the majority of extant studies
([2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [11]) develop analytical
model to examine limited version free trial,
time-locked free trial, seeding strategies in a monopoly
setting. Zhang et al. ([13]) studied freemium strategy in
a duopoly setting, but they omitted the learning effect
and derived conclusions by strictly assuming that the
quality of the full version is identical among two firms.
We consider network effect, cannibalization effect and
learning effect to investigate the freemium strategy in a
competition setting where the two app developers offer
vertically-differentiated apps. Ma and Kauffman ([10])
investigated competition between software-as-a-service
vendors by considering the sampling behavior of the
clients. In their model, each client chooses one vendor
for sampling and learns the exact value of the product
after using it for a period of time. However, in the app
market, the users are able to try all of the offered free
versions before making the final decisions due to the

negligible using cost, but they cannot get the exact
value of the full version unless using it because of the
difference of the functionality between the free version
and the full version. The analysis based on our model
provides insights for competition between app
developers who consider adopting freemium strategy
(offering
limited-functionality
version
and
full-functionality version) and pay-per-download
strategy, where the learning effect, network effect and
cannibalization effect are examined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
introduce our general model framework in Section 2.
The results are analyzed and discussed in Section 3.
We finally conclude the paper in Section 4.

2. Model
We model competition between two app developers,
who can adopt one of two strategies: (i)
pay-per-download strategy, a strategy where consumers
pay to get the app; (ii) freemium strategy, a strategy
where the app developer offers the basic version for
free and charges for the full version.
The sequence of the game is as follows. In stage 1,
the app developers simultaneously decide their
strategies to adopt. In stag 2, after observing the
opponent’s choice made in stage 1, the app developers
announce the prices of their apps. In stage 3,
consumers make purchase decisions based on their
expected utilities. Specifically, when both app
developers adopt the freemium strategy, each consumer
tries both basic-version apps before making the final
choice. Each consumer chooses to adopt an app from
one of the developers, and decides the version if both
versions are offered. Under the freemium strategy,
before making the final purchase decision, consumers
try the basic-version app and adjust their expected
utilities toward the two versions according to the
realized quality of the free version.
A consumer’s expected utility is composed of two
parts: the intrinsic valuation and the network-based
valuation. The intrinsic valuation is determined by the
quality preference of a consumer and the prior belief of
the quality.
measures consumer
’s quality
preference, which is uniformly distributed on the
and
support of 0,1 . Let
1,2 stand for
the quality of the basic version and the full version of
app , respectively. We assume that consumers have
consistent prior beliefs of the quality, and they do not
know the true value of the quality until they purchase
and experience the app. To capture uncertainty in the
quality of the app prior to purchase, the quality of the
basic version of app ( ) is randomly drawn from a
and variance
, whereas
distribution with mean
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the quality of full version of app ( ) is randomly
drawn from a distribution with mean
and variance
. After trying the basic functionalities of the free
version, consumers under freemium strategy know the
actual value of
and adjust their belief of the
full-version quality, which could be computed with
,
(1)
Ε
where the intensity of learning effect

and

describe the coefficient of correlation between
and . Therefore, consumer ’s intrinsic valuation of
app under pay-per-download strategy is
. After
trying the basic version under freemium strategy,
consumer ’s intrinsic valuation of the basic version of
, and that of the full version is
app
is
. Without loss of generality, we assume
Ε
and
.
Following Prasad et al. ([12]), we assume that the
network-based valuations are linearly-increasing with
the size of the user base and consumers have perfect
denote the
foresight about equilibrium demand. Let
intensity of network effect of app , which means the
marginal utility that a consumer joins the network.
Thus, the network-based valuation of app
under
pay-per-download strategy is
, where
stands
for the demand of the app in equilibrium. The
network-based valuation of app
under freemium
strategy is
, where
and
represent the number of consumers paying nothing to
use the basic version and the number of consumers
purchasing the full version, respectively.
Let
stand for the price of app
under
pay-per-download strategy or the price of the full
version of app under freemium strategy. When app
developer adopts pay-per-download strategy, the net
utility of consumer toward app is
.
(2)
to maximize his
App developer sets the price
profit, which could be calculated by
.
(3)
Π
When app developer adopts freemium strategy,
after trying the basic version of the app, consumer ’s
utility toward the free version is
,
(4)
and her utility toward the full version is
.
(5)
Ε
App developer sets the price
to maximize his
profit, which could be calculated by
Π
.
(6)

2.1 Case PP: Duopoly with Both App
Developers
Adopting
Pay-Per-Download
Strategy
When two app developers both adopt
pay-per-download strategy, each consumer chooses one
of the two apps to maximize her utility. Thus, the
market is divided into three segments, which is
illustrated in Figure 1.

0

1

2

1

Figure 1. Consumer segmentation when both
app developers adopt pay-per-download
strategy
Consumers with low
purchase nothing, and
consumers with moderate
purchase app 1, and
consumers with high
purchase app 2. By setting
0, we get the quality preference of the consumer
who is indifferent regarding to purchase nothing or app
1
.
(7)
By setting
, we get the quality preference
of the consumer who is indifferent regarding to
purchase app 1 or app 2
.
(8)
Based on above expressions of indifferent points,
we have the following equations
,

(9)

,

(10)

and solve them to get the expressions of consumer
and
into the profit
demand. By substituting
function and solving the first order conditions of the
profit functions, we find the equilibrium solutions of
the sub-game Case PP.
Proposition 1. When
0 ,
0 ,
/
0，2
0
,
2
/
0 , the prices in equilibrium are
/
2
2
4
,
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
/ 4
2
4
, the consumer demands in
4
4
equilibrium
are
/
,
/
.
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2.2 Case PF/FP: Duopoly with One App
Developer
Adopting
Pay-Per-Download
Strategy and One App Developer Adopting
Freemium Strategy
When app developer 1 adopts freemium strategy
and app developer 2 adopts pay-per-download strategy,
there are two cases of consumer segmentation, which
are illustrated in Figure 2.

0

1

(a) Case 1:

0

2

0

1

2.3 Case FF: Duopoly with Both App
Developers Adopting Freemium Strategy
When two app developers both adopt freemium
strategy, consumers have four choices after trying basic
versions of two apps. Four cases of consumer
segmentation are illustrated in Figure 3.

1

1

2

different strategies. Due to the limitation of the space,
we omit the specific expressions of prices, consumer
demand and profit in equilibrium as well as
corresponding conditions in subgame Case FP. When
app developer 1 adopts pay-per-download strategy and
app developer 2 adopts freemium strategy, the
equilibrium of the subgame Case PF could be derived
in a similar way.

1

1

0

(b) Case 2:

0

1

Figure 2. Consumer segmentation when app
developer 1 adopts freemium strategy and app
developer 2 adopts pay-per-download strategy
In case 1 where
,
after trying the basic version of app 1, consumers’
expected quality of app 2 is lower than their expected
quality of full version of app 1. Consumers with low
use basic version of app 1 for free, and consumers with
moderate
purchase app 2, and consumers with high
purchase full version of app 1. By setting
and
, we get the expressions of the
indifferent points as
.
(11)
.

(12)

,
In case 2 where
after trying the basic version of app 1, consumers’
expected quality of app 2 is higher than their expected
quality of full version of app 1. Thus, consumers with
low
use basic version of app 1 for free, and
consumers with moderate
purchase full version of
app 1, and consumers with high
purchase app 2. By
and
, the indifferent
setting
points could be computed by
.
(13)
.

2

1

(a) Case 1:

(14)

Based on the above expressions of indifferent
points, we derive the expressions of consumer demand
and further find the equilibrium solutions for the
competition game when two app developers adopt

or
0

1

0

1

0

1

2

1

(b) Case 2:
or
1

0

0

1

(c) Case 3:

0

(d) Case 4:

0

2

3

2

0

1

1

0

1

1
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Figure 3. Consumer segmentation when both
app developers adopt freemium strategy
In Case 1, no consumers only use basic version of
app 1. Consumers with low
use basic version of app
2 for free, and consumers with moderate
purchase
full version of app 1, and consumers with high
purchase full version of app 2. By setting
, the indifferent points could be
and
computed by
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,
.

(15)

3.1 Equilibrium PP

(16)

Table 3 and Table 4 present equilibrium profits,
prices and consumer demand for the four possible
is large but
is
market configurations when
small (
0.3 and
0.1).

In Case 2, no consumers use basic version of app 2
only. Consumers with low
use basic version of app
1 for free, and consumers with moderate-to-high
purchase full versions of two apps. By setting
and
, we get the indifferent
points as
,
(17)
.

(18)

In Case 3 and Case 4, consumers with low
use
basic versions of two apps, and consumers with high
purchase full versions of two apps. The difference
between these two cases is that the basic version of app
1 is favored by consumers with low
in Case 3 but
it’s favored by consumers with moderate
in Case 4.
,
and
In Case 3, setting
, the expressions of the indifferent points are
,

Table 3. The equilibrium profits for the four
possible market configurations
App 2
App 1
Pay-per-download
strategy
Freemium
strategy

(20)
.

(21)

In Case 4, the expressions of
and
could be
computed with Equation (19) and Equation (21) . By
setting
, the expressions of
is
.
(22)
Based on the above expressions of indifferent
points, we can compute consumer demand and further
find the equilibrium solutions. Due to the limitation of
the space, we omit the specific expressions of prices,
consumer demand and profit in equilibrium as well as
corresponding conditions in subgame Case FF.

3. Analysis
Because the sub-game-perfect Nash equilibrium of
the four cases derived in Section 2 is complicated, we
resort to numerical methods to solve the 2 2 payoff
matrix to get the market equilibrium of the game. By
setting
0.2 ,
0.3 ,
0.01 ,
0.02 ,
0.3 and
0.3 , we analyze the four
equilibriums and explain how the quality of basic
and
impact market equilibrium
versions
solutions when the difference in consumers’ expected
quality toward full versions of two apps is moderate
(
0.8 and
1) in section 3.1-3.5, and we
and
on market
further analyze the impact of
equilibrium solutions in section 3.6. In section 3.7 and
,
,
and
affect
3.8, we examine how
profits of two app developers in four cases.

Freemium
strategy
Π
0.005
Π
0.053
0.004
Π
Π
0.042

Table 4. The equilibrium prices and demand
under the four possible market configurations
Price
Case PP

(19)
,

Pay-per-download
strategy
Π
0.011
Π
0.077
Π
0.008
Π
0.064

Case FP
Case PF
Case FF

0.039
0.114
0.030
0.095
0.022
0.076
0.015
0.058

Demand
0.282
0.674
0.056,

0.267
0.677
0.251

0.049,
0,
0.039,

0.701
0.235
0.726

, consumers’ expected quality of
Because
full version after trying the basic version is lower than
that before trying the basic version. Thus, app
developer 2 chooses pay-per-download strategy to
avoid the decreases of consumers’ expected quality. In
that way, app developer 2 can charge a much higher
price. Although the consumer demand under
pay-per-download strategy is slightly lower than that
under freemium strategy, the app developer 2 can earn
more profit under pay-per-download strategy.
, consumers’ expected quality of
Because
full version increases after trying the basic version,
which shrinks the difference in the quality of two apps
and intensify competition. In order to moderate the
competition, app developer 1 adopts pay-per-download
strategy. Compared with adopting freemium strategy,
when app developer 1 adopts pay-per-download
strategy, he can charge a higher price and get more
consumers to purchase the full version.
is large but
Case PP is an equilibrium when
is small. In equilibrium, consumers with moderate
quality preference buy app 1 and consumers with high
quality preference buy app 2.
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3.2 Equilibrium FP

3.3 Equilibrium PF

In Table 5 and Table 6, we present equilibrium
results for the four possible market configurations
and
are small (
when
0.1 and
0.2).

Table 7 and Table 8 present equilibrium results for
is
the four possible market configurations when
small and
is large (
0.1 and
0.6).

Table 5. The equilibrium profits for the four
possible market configurations

Table 7. The equilibrium profits for the four
possible market configurations

App 2
App 1
Pay-per-download
strategy
Freemium
strategy

Pay-per-download
strategy
0.011
Π
Π
0.077
Π
0.012
Π
0.086

Freemium
strategy
0.007
Π
Π
0.063
Π
0.008
Π
0.073

Table 6. The equilibrium prices and demand
under the four possible market configurations
Price
Case PP
Case FP
Case PF
Case FF

0.039
0.114
0.043
0.131
0.027
0.094
0.030
0.109

App 2
App 1
Pay-per-download
strategy
Freemium
strategy

Price

0.282
0.674
0.064,

Case PP
0.279

0.657
0.259
0.677
0.256
0.67

After trying the basic version of app 2 whose true
value of the quality is lower than consumers’ prior
), users decrease their expected quality
belief (
toward the full version of app 2. Although the app
developer loses some consumers when he turns from
freemium strategy to pay-per-download strategy, he
can charge a higher price and earn more profit. Thus,
app developer 2 adopts pay-per-download strategy.
, consumers decrease their
Because
expected quality of the full version of app 1 after trying
the basic version. Consequently, consumers’ expected
quality of the full version of app 1 under
pay-per-download strategy is higher than the adjusted
expected quality under freemium strategy. To moderate
competition with app 2, app developer 1 adopts
freemium strategy to lower consumers’ expected
quality of his app. Compared with adopting
pay-per-download strategy, app developer 1 adopting
freemium strategy can charge a significantly higher
price at the cost of losing few consumers, which brings
more profit to the developers.
and
are
Case FP is an equilibrium when
small. In equilibrium, consumers with low quality
preference use basic version of app 1, and those with
moderate quality preference buy full version of app 1,
and those with high quality preference buy app 2.

Freemium
strategy
0.005
Π
0.090
Π
0.004
Π
Π
0.096

Table 8. The equilibrium prices and demand
under the four possible market configurations

Demand

0.065,
0,
0.075,

Pay-per-download
strategy
Π
0.011
0.077
Π
Π
0.012
Π
0.086

Case FP
Case PF
Case FF

0.039
0.114
0.043
0.131
0.021
0.151
0.019
0.165

Demand
0.282
0.674
0.064,

0.279
0.657
0.237

0.169,
0,
0.187,

0.594
0.230
0.584

When the true value of quality for the basic version
of app 2 is higher than consumers’ expected quality
), consumers increase their expected quality
(
toward full version of app 2 after trying the basic
version. Thus, app developer 2 can use freemium
strategy to charge a higher price and earn a larger
amount of revenue.
,
As analyzed in section 3.2, when
consumers’ expected quality toward full version of app
1 decreases after trying the basic version. To moderate
competition between high-quality free version of app 2
and paid version of app 1, app developer 1 has to adopt
pay-per-download strategy rather than freemium
strategy to keep consumers’ expected quality toward
full version as higher as possible. Under
pay-per-download strategy, the app developer 1 can
charge a higher price and also get more consumer
demand.
is small and
Case PF is an equilibrium when
is large. In equilibrium, consumers with low quality
preference use basic version of app 2 for free, and
consumers with moderate preference choose app 1, and
consumers with high preference purchase full version
of app 2.
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3.4 Equilibrium FF
Table 9 and Table 10 present equilibrium results for
and
the four possible market configurations when
are large (
0.3 and
0.7).
Table 9. The equilibrium profits for the four
possible market configurations
App 2
App 1
Pay-per-download
strategy
Freemium
strategy

Pay-per-download
strategy
Π
0.011
Π
0.077
Π
0.008
Π
0.064

Freemium
strategy
Π
0.002
Π
0.092
Π
0.003
Π
0.086

summarize our observations in Results 1.
and the difference of
Results 1. If
and
is moderate, market equilibria under different
are:
,
is small and
i) Case FP is an equilibrium when
is small;
ii) Case PF is an equilibrium when
is small
and
is large or when
is large and
is
moderate;
is large
iii) Case PP is an equilibrium when
and
is small;
iv) Case FF is an equilibrium when
is small
and
is moderate or when
is large and
is
large.

Table 10. The equilibrium prices and demand
under the four possible market configurations
Price

Case FP
Case PF
Case FF

0.056,

2

0.282
0.674

a

Case PP

Demand

0.039
0.114
0.030
0.095
0.009
0.159
0.013
0.146

0.267
0.677
0.194

0.231,
0,
0.202,

0.575
0.211
0.586

, the app developer 2 adopts
Due to
freemium strategy. Because consumers increase their
expected quality toward full version of app 2 after
trying the basic version, the app developer 2 can charge
a higher price and earn more profit under freemium
strategy.
Because app developer 2 offers a free version of
high quality, app developer 1 has to face an intensive
competition from free version of app 2. To increase
consumers’ expected quality of full version of app 1,
app developer 1 adopts freemium strategy. In that way,
app developer 1 can charge a higher price and also get
more consumers.
and
are
Case FF is an equilibrium when
large. In equilibrium, no consumers use free version of
app 1. Consumers with low quality preference choose
free version of app 2, and consumers with moderate
quality preference buy full version of app 1, and
consumers with high quality preference purchase full
version of app 2.

3.5 Impact of
equilibrium

and

on Market

Figure 4 illustrates how quality of the basic
and
impact the strategy adopted by
versions
each app developer in equilibrium. We further

Figure 4. Market equilibria in
Notes. Figure 4 is based on
1,
0.01,
0.02,

-

space

0.2,
0.3,
0.8,
0.3 and
0.3.

App developer 2, who offers high-quality app,
is small,
adopts pay-per-download strategy when
but he adopts freemium strategy when
is large. If
the true value of the quality
is much higher than
consumer’s expected quality
, the app developer
prefers to offer a basic version because consumers’
expected quality of the full version increases after they
is lower than
, the app
try the basic version. If
developer has no incentive to offer a basic version.
Trying the basic version decreases consumers’
expected quality of the full version and reduces the
is slightly higher
profit of the app developer. If
than
, the app developer adopts pay-per-download
strategy. Although offering the basic version can
slightly increase consumers’ expected quality of the
full version, it cannibalizes demand of the full version,
which hurts the developer’s profit.
is small, where consumers decrease their
When
expected quality of the full version after trying the
basic version, we find that app developer 1 chooses
is small-to-moderate.
freemium strategy when
When
is large, consumers’ expected quality of the
full version increases after trying the basic version.
However, app developer 1 adopts pay-per-download
is
strategy rather than freemium strategy when
small-to-moderate. The rationale behind these
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counter-intuitive results is that the strategy adopted by
app developer 1 helps to lower consumers’ expected
quality of the full version and enlarge the difference in
the quality of two apps, which reduces competition
between two app developers and enable them to earn
more profit.
When
is large, where app developer 2 adopts
freemium strategy, app developer 1 will choose the
strategy that can increase consumers’ expected quality
of the full version to moderate competition against the
free version of app 2. Therefore, app developer 1
adopts pay-per-download strategy to avoid decrease of
expected quality after trying the basic version when
is small, and he adopts freemium strategy to increase
consumers’ expected quality by offering free version
is large.
when

and

3.6 Impact of
equilibrium

on Market
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Figure 5 illustrate how consumers’ expected quality
and
impact the
of the full versions
equilibrium. We further summarize our observations in
Results 2.

0.4,

0.2

(d)

Figure 5. Market equilibria in
Notes. Figure 5 is based on
0.02,
0.3 and

0.2,
0.3.

FF

Ca

0.25,

-

se

PF

0.6

space
0.3,

0.01,

, as the difference of
Results 2. When
increases, the changes of market equilibria
and
are:
i) If
and
are small, the equilibrium changes
from Case FP to Case PP;
is small and
is large, the equilibrium
ii) If
changes from Case FF, Case PF to Case FP and Case

PP;
is large and
is small, the equilibrium
iii) If
is Case PP;
and
are large, the equilibrium
iv) If
changes from Case PF, Case FF to Case PP.
When the true values of quality of basic versions
are lower than consumers’ prior belief, app developer 2
adopts pay-per-download strategy to avoid the decrease
of consumers’ expected quality toward the full version.
The response of app developer 1 depends on the
and
. When
is close to
,
difference of
app developer 1 uses freemium strategy to decrease
consumers’ expected quality of the full version by
offering the basic version for trial. In that way, the
difference of consumers’ expected quality of two apps
enlarges, which moderate the competition. When
is much lower than
, the competition between the
two apps is weak. Therefore, app developer 1 uses
pay-per-download strategy to increase consumers’
expected quality and earn more profit.
is lower than
and
is higher than
When
, app developer 2 adopts freemium strategy when
is close to
but he uses pay-per-download
strategy when
is much lower than
. In the
former situations, faced with intensive competition,
app developer 2 offers basic version to increase
consumers’ expected quality of full version and get
more consumers. In the latter situations, the
competition between two apps is weak. App developer
2 prefers to use pay-per-download strategy rather than
freemium strategy to avoid cannibalization effect of the
free version. As for the response of app developer 1, he
uses freemium strategy to increase quality difference of
is higher, and he adopts
two apps when
pay-per-download strategy to charge a higher price
is lower.
when
When
is higher than
and
is lower than
, both app developers adopt pay-per-download
strategy in equilibrium. Because
, app
developer 2 has no incentive to offer the free version.
, to avoid causing intense
Although
competition against app 2 and cannibalizing demand of
full version, app developer 1 doesn’t offer free version
in equilibrium. That is, the best response of app
developer 1 is to use pay-per-download strategy.
and
are higher compared with
When
and
, app developer 2 adopts freemium strategy to
increase consumers’ expected quality toward full
is close to
where the competition
version if
is intense, while he uses pay-per-download strategy to
avoid free version cannibalizing demand of full version
is much higher than
where the competition
if
is weak. Responding to pay-per-download strategy
adopted by app developer 2, app developer 1 uses
pay-per-download strategy which helps to moderate
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competition and avoids cannibalizing effect of the free
version. Responding to freemium strategy adopted by
app developer 2, app developer 1 uses
pay-per-download strategy when the difference of
and
is small, whereas he adopts freemium
strategy when the difference of
and
is
moderate. The rationale is as follows. Compared with
adopting pay-per-download strategy, using freemium
strategy increases consumers’ expected quality of the
full version but shrinks the difference in expected
quality of two apps. Therefore, freemium strategy will
be used by app developer 1 only if the difference of
and
is not low.

3.7 Impact of

and

network effect of app 2, consumer’s valuation toward
app 2 increases. The app developer 2 charges a lower
price to attract a larger number of users, thus he earns
more profit. Faced with the lower price charged by the
competitor, the app developer 1 has to reduce his price
but lose some users, thus his profit decreases.

3.8 Impact of

and

on Profits

Figure 7 illustrates how the intensity of learning
effect
and
impacts the profits of app
developers in four cases. Our observations are
summarized in Results 4.
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Results 3. The impact of network effect on profits of
app developers is as follows:
i) as the intensity of network effect of app 1
increases, the profits of two app developers decrease;
ii) as the intensity of network effect of app 2
increases, the profit of app 1 decreases but the profit of
app 2 increases.
With the increase of the intensity of network effect
of app 1, consumers’ valuation toward app 1 increases,
which reduces the differentiation of two apps and
intensifies the competition, thus both app developers
lose profit. With the increase of the intensity of

Results 4. When consumers’ beliefs increase after free
trials, the impact of learning effect on profits of app
developers is as follows:
i) as the intensity of learning effect of app 1
increases, the profits of two app developers decrease;
ii) as the intensity of learning effect of app 2
increases, the profits of two app developers increase.
In situations where consumers’ quality beliefs
increase after free trials, as the intensity of learning
effect of app 1 increases, consumers generate higher
valuations toward the full version of app 1 when the
free version is offered. The differentiation of apps
created by two developers reduces, thus the two app
developers decrease app prices, which hurt their profits.
As the intensity of learning effect of app 2 increases,
consumers generate higher valuations toward full
version of app 2 when free version is offered. Thus, the
differentiation of apps created by the two app
developers increases, which enables the two app
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developers to charge higher prices and earn more
profits.

4. Conclusion
Motivated by practical examples in app market, we
analyze how app developers choose revenue model in a
duopoly setting. The two app developers offer
vertically-differentiated apps and choose to adopt
pay-per-download strategy or freemium strategy in the
presence of network effect and experience-based
learning effect.
We find that when the difference in consumers’
expected quality of full versions of two apps is large,
both app developers use pay-per-download strategy,
otherwise each app developer may adopt either one of
the strategies depending on specific conditions. When
the difference in consumers’ expected quality of full
versions of two apps is moderate, the developer
offering high-quality app uses freemium strategy if true
quality of the free version is much higher than
consumers’
belief,
otherwise
he
chooses
pay-per-download strategy. However, the response of
developer offering low-quality app can be totally
conversed according to the relationship of consumer
belief and true quality. When the competitor offering
high-quality app uses pay-per-download strategy, the
developer offering low-quality app chooses
pay-per-download strategy if true quality of the free
version is much higher than consumers’ belief,
otherwise he chooses freemium strategy.
Our findings show that the app developers in the
market with intensive competition should adopt the
strategy that can raise the differentiation between the
products and reduce the competition. For example, if
the consumers’ beliefs of two apps decrease after free
trial, the app developer should adopt pay-per-download
strategy when the users prefer his app but freemium
strategy when the users prefer the app created by the
competitor. The leader in the market only offers a full
version to avoid the decrease of consumers’ belief after
free trial. Responding to the action of the leader, the
follower in the market augments the differentiation of
the two apps and earns more profit by offering the free
version to decrease consumers’ belief of his own app.
In addition to the competition effect, the app developer
should also consider the cannibalization effect. In
situations where consumers’ beliefs of the apps
increase after free trial, the leader can use
pay-per-download strategy to maximize his profit when
the difference in consumers’ beliefs of two apps is
significant. Because of the weak competition, the
developer mainly considers cannibalization effect and
chooses to offer only the full version to avoid
cannibalization of demands of two versions.

Our analysis can be further extended in multiple
ways. First, we assume that the quality of free version
is exogenous, but the decision of quality can be
considered to provide more guidelines on app design.
Second, other than pay-per-download strategy and
freemium strategy, in-app-purchase strategy and
subscription strategy are also prevalent in app market,
which are worth investigating in competition
environment.
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